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DERRIDA, LAW, VIOLENCE AND THE 
PARADOX OF JUSTICE 
Michel Rosenfeld* 
My contribution to this roundtable is meant to be in the form of 
a comment on—or more precisely of a small supplement to—^Jacques 
Derrida's extraordinarily rich and insightful text entitled Force of 
Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority" ̂  from the standpoint of 
a common-law jurist. Derrida's text touches upon a vast number of 
essential issues in jurisprudence, but I wish to focus on one issue in 
particular: the relation between law, violence, and the paradox posed 
by the concurrent requirement that justice be both universal and 
singular. 
Derrida succinctly captures the paradox of justice when he 
writes: 
To address oneself to the other in the language of the other is, it 
seems, the condition of all possible justice, but apparently, in all 
rigor, it is not only impossible ... but even excluded by justice as 
law (droit), inasmuch as justice as right seems to imply an element 
of universality, the appeal to a third party who suspends the uni-
laterality or singularity of the idioms.^ 
In other words, Derrida stresses that there is an unsurmountable gap 
between justice as law, which must remain forever universal, and jus­
tice as giving to each what is his or her due, which necessarily in­
volves an element of irreducible singularity. Derrida's dichotomy 
between justice as law and justice as each person's due is reminiscent, 
moreover, of Aristotle's distinction between justice as equality and 
justice as equity.^ However, whereas for Aristotle justice as equity is 
meant to supplement justice as equality, for Derrida justice as each 
person's due is not only impossible but it also completely frustrates 
the achievement of justice as law. In the Aristotelian universe, justice 
as equality is the rule and justice as equity is introduced to deal with 
the exception. For Derrida, in contrast, every case appears to be an 
exception, or more accurately—in view of the respective demands of 
equality and of the irreducible singularity of the other—every case 
should (but is inevitably bound to fail to) satisfy both the rule and the 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
1 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1990). 
2 Id. at 949. 
3 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V (D. Ross trans. 1980). 
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exception.'* 
The disjunction between justice as equality and justice as equity 
is linked in the Derridian vision—to a series of insurmountable op­
positions that include: the clash between self and other, the singular 
and the universal, the concrete and the abstract, and the rule and its 
exceptions. Moreover, it is because it is caught between these insur­
mountable oppositions that justice cannot avoid producing violence. 
Thus, for example, when the self presses its claims in the name of 
justice it is bound to do violence to the other. But, by the same token, 
when the self restrains the pursuit of its own claims to do justice to 
the other, it does violence to itself. 
It would be not only dangerous but also plainly erroneous to in­
fer that it necessarily follows from Derrida's behef in the impossibility 
of achieving justice and in the inevitability of the link between vio­
lence and the pursuit of justice that the quest for justice is meaningless 
or that all plausible dispositions of the conflicting claims of self and 
other are likely to be morally equivalent. Indeed, at least in my read­
ing of Derrida, the quest for justice is a permanent ethical imperative. 
Moreover, the particular form which that ethical imperative takes for 
any given individual actor depends on the actual social and historical 
circumstances surrounding that actor. Thus, although justice is ulti­
mately beyond reach, the call to justice imposes real constraints that 
circumscribe the legitimate choices open to morally responsible 
actors. 
Looking at the matter from the standpoint of an American jurist, 
it is striking how close Derrida's conception of the relationship be­
tween law and justice comes to that which emerges from the common-
law system of adjudication. Under the common law, legal rules are 
fashioned through the application of precedents. Confronted with the 
clashing arguments of opposing litigants, the common-law judge seeks 
a just resolution of the case at hand by reaching a verdict that is con­
sistent with relevant past judicial decisions. The rule of law to be 
applied to a pending case must be inferred from existing judicial 
precedents. That rule, however, can never be completely elaborated 
as Its full and final determination must await the completion of all 
relevant future adjudications. Accordingly, whereas every adjudica­
tion sharply circumscribes the legitimate avenues towards justice, so 
" Stnctly speaking, the exception is defined in terms of the rule from which it deviates 
and IS thus m some sense subordinate to the latter. In the context of a Derridian vision' 
however, the subordination of the exception to the rule would unduly privilege the latter over 
the former. Accordingly, I use "rule" here primarily to denote the universal side of justice and 
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long as any future adjudication remains possible the achievement of 
justice is necessarily postponed. 
To illustrate how the common law makes justice both necessary 
to pursue and impossible to achieve let us consider the following 
rather banal example.' Suppose A's cat has entered on B's land and 
wrecked the latter's flowers. B then sues his neighbor A and seeks 
compensation for the wrecked flowers. To adjudicate this contro­
versy, the judge must look to precedents. Let us assume, moreover, 
that the judge finds a single precedent, namely a case where a cow's 
owner was held liable for the damages caused when his cow entered 
upon his neighbor's land. In these circumstances, the judge's decision 
in the case between A and B depends on her assessment of whether 
the situation involving the cat is sufficiently analogous to that con­
cerning the cow. Because of the extremely schematic nature of the 
example under consideration, we lack the means to make any princi­
pled decision as to whether the situations involving respectively the 
cow and the cat ought to be considered essentially alike or fundamen­
tally different. Suppose, however, that the judge can justify the con­
clusion that the two situations are alike in all relevant respects and 
that B is therefore entitled to compensation from A. By linking the 
precedent involving the cow with that regarding the cat one can begin 
to infer a general legal rule, but without the benefit of further cases it 
is impossible to specify which rule. One possible rule would be that 
justice requires that an owner of domestic animals be liable for the 
mischief which they cause; another, that an owner of any animal, 
whether domestic or not, be so liable. Furthermore, a future case may 
well decide between these two rules, but would leave open, for exam­
ple, the question of whether an owner's children should be considered 
akin to that Owner's domestic animals from the standpoint of the legal 
responsibility under consideration. In short, the force of precedents 
delimits paths towards justice but the dependence of legal rules on 
future cases forces a perpetual postponement of justice—that is, of 
justice understood as necessarily encompassing both the singularity of 
each individual case and the universality of every fully elaborated 
legal rule. 
It is not necessary to remain within the confines of the common 
law to appreciate that justice is inevitably caught between the univer­
sal and the singular, the abstract and the concrete. Indeed, one can­
not dispense genuine justice to a concrete other without first fulfilling 
5 This example is based on the one provided in Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Inter­
pretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1211, 1231 n.48 (1990). 
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the demands of abstract equality. Paradoxically, it is the need for 
justice to fully account for the singularity of the concrete other which 
makes recourse to abstract equality imperative. Moreover, this nexus 
between abstract equality and concrete singularity is underscored by 
the very structure of the search for justice in its two principal forms: 
corrective or compensatory justice and distributive justice. 
Compensatory justice seeks to wipe out the suflFering of a con­
crete other by exacting compensation from the wrongdoer who has 
caused the suffering. Compensatory justice aims at placing the victim 
of wrongdoing in the position he or she would have been but for the 
wrong sought to be compensated. This position is projected as the 
singular historical position of a concrete person but is, in fact, a 
counterfactual construct mediated by some criterion of abstract 
equality. Not all sufferings or harms experienced by a concrete other 
are subject to compensation, but only those that are recognized as 
wrongs. And to be able to draw any cogent line between wrongs and 
noncompensable harms, one must have recourse to some notion of 
abstract equality.® 
Distributive justice, which requires that the benefits and burdens 
of social cooperation be allocated according to a plausible criterion of 
proportional equality, is obviously dependent on the implementation 
of some conception of abstract equality. For example, distributive 
justice may require that allocation be made to each according to his or 
her merit or according to his or her needs. Furthermore, notwith­
standing its focus on abstract equality, distributive justice cannot be 
satisfied without taking full account of the singularity of each con­
crete person who belongs to the class of those entitled to claim distrib­
utive rights. Thus, if the operative criterion were to each according to 
his or her needs, distributive justice could not be fully realized before 
every need of every person were properly taken into account in its 
ultimately irreducible singularity. 
Viewed phenomenologically, justice—whether compensatory or 
distributive—requires the passage from concrete singularity to ab­
stract equality and then back to the singularity of the concrete other. 
At first, it is precisely by emphasizing the differences that mark the 
distinction between self and other, that the self can cast the other as 
^ For example, depending on whether one adopts formal equality or equality of welfare as 
the operative criterion of abstract equality, one is likely to reach different conclusions concern­
ing whether a person's action which causes another person significant economic harm amounts 
to a compensable wrong. Thus, a proponent of formal equality rights would not consider the 
harms due to the vicissitudes of economic competition to be compensable wrongs. A propo­
nent of equality of welfare, on the other hand, may well maintain that at least some of these 
harms should be treated as compensable wrongs. 
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an inferior and treat him or her as an unequal.' To overcome the 
injustices flowing from the use of difference to foster inequality, it is in 
tum necessary to promote mutual recognition as equals, but that re­
quires looking beyond concrete differences and relating to one another 
as abstract egos that are essentially equal in dignity.® From the stand­
point of abstract equality, equality tends to be correlated to identity. 
Accordingly, persons can avoid being treated as inferiors, but only by 
conforming to the identity projected by the dominant other.' In order 
to overcome the limitations of abstract equality, it is necessary to re­
turn to the singularity of each concrete person without regressing to 
the position from which the concrete other tends to be perceived ex­
clusively in terms of differences. In other words, the achievement of 
justice ultimately depends on (the impossible to complete) synthesis 
between the essential identity in dignity sustained by abstract equality 
and the full diversity generated by the irreducible singularity radiated 
by each concrete person. 
Treating the other as inferior obviously entails violence. More­
over, while perhaps less obvious, the pursuit of abstract equality and 
the drive to vindicate the singularity of each concrete person also nec­
essarily involve violence. Indeed, abstract equality looms as the prod­
uct of the counterviolence that unhinges interpersonal relationships 
predicated on inequality and of the violence that suppresses the differ­
ences prone to hinder mutual recognition as subjects possessing equal 
dignity. Furthermore, the drive to vindicate the singularity of each 
concrete person without reverting to relationships of inequality is also 
dependent on violence, although the violence in question is primarily 
turned inward to curb the self's tendency to treat the other as an 
inferior or to identify him or her as a mere abstract equal. 
Justice is inevitably tied to violence, but that does not constitute 
a justification to abandon its pursuit. Indeed, not all violence is alike, 
as the violence involved in reducing another to a subservient position 
clearly seems more objectionable than the (counter) violence required 
to establish abstract equality or the self-directed violence associated 
with promoting the singularity of the concrete other. Accordingly, 
' For example, by emphasizing differences in skin color, the racist can cast members of 
other races as inferiors and thus purport to justify denying them equal rights. 
8 Cf. G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 178-96 (A. Miller trans. 1977) (Hegel's 
dialectic of master and slave). 
® Thus, for instance, women may achieve equality at the workplace by behaving "like 
men," that is by repressing their femininity and by concealing their needs as women. For a 
more extended discussion of the tendency to correlate difference to inferiority and equality to 
identity, see M. ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE; A PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY 222-24 (1991). 
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the nexus between justice and violence should not be a cause for des­
pair, but rather a cause for sobering reflection. Similarly, the impossi­
bility of achieving justice and the inability of law to fully account for 
the universal and the singular should not be a cause for paralysis. On 
the contrary, the inevitability of violence and the impossibility of jus­
tice should be construed as a call to measured but continuous action 
through law in efforts to reduce inequities and to promote equality 
without sacrificing singularity. In the last analysis, that the task of 
seeking justice can never be completed and that violence cannot be 
eradicated from the path to law and justice should be viewed as im­
portant truths that no ethical jurist can afford to ignore. 
